Contracts in Cyberspace And The New Regulation ”Rome I” by Bogdan, Michael
2009] M. Bogdan: Contracts in Cyberspace and the Regulation ”Rome I” 219
CONTRACTS IN CYBERSPACE AND
THE NEW REGULATION ”ROME I”
by
MICHAEL BOGDAN*
The new EC Regulation on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations (Regu-
lation Rome I), adopted on 17 June 2008, contains rules dealing with situations in-
volving a conflict of laws in the field of contracts. It will replace the 1980 Rome 
Convention and bring about a number of important changes, some of which will af-
fect directly contracts entered into or performed through the Internet.
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Many contracts made through the Internet are of an international character. 
The parties may habitually reside in different countries and/or the perform-
ance of the contractual obligations may take place, or is supposed to take 
place, in a country other than that or those of the parties’ habitual residence. 
Sometimes the contract is not only entered into through the Internet but is 
even performed through the same,  such  as  when the delivery of  digital 
goods (for example music, movies or computer games) takes place by elec-
tronic downloading and the payment is effected on-line by a credit card or a 
money transfer. 
Just like other contractual undertakings, even the Internet-related con-
tracts can give rise to many types of disputes to be solved by applying legal 
rules. If the contract is connected with more than one country, and thereby 
with several legal systems potentially providing different solutions to the 
disputed legal issue, the applicable legal system will have to be designated 
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by the  private  international  law (the  conflict-of-laws  rules)  of  the forum 
country.  These  conflict-of-laws  rules  have  traditionally  also  varied  from 
country  to  country,  making  the  outcome of  adjudication  depend on the 
country of the forum and consequently inviting the plaintiff to choose that 
country on the basis of tactical  considerations (the so-called forum shop-
ping, which is particularly attractive when, like in the European Union, ju-
dicial decisions made in one Member State are in principle recognized and 
enforced throughout the territory of all Member States).1
It is therefore hardly surprising that the countries involved in the pro-
cess of European integration attempted, at a relatively early stage, to unify 
their conflict-of-laws rules in this field, in particular after having realized 
that due to the numerous fundamental differences between their substant-
ive provisions pertaining to contracts neither a complete unification nor a 
far-reaching harmonization of their laws was a realistic alternative in the 
short run. These efforts resulted in 1980 in the signing of the Convention on 
the  Law Applicable  to  Contractual  Obligations2 (this  Convention,  which 
entered into force in 1991, is commonly called the Rome Convention and 
must not be confused with the Rome Treaty of 1957 establishing the Euro-
pean Economic Community). Due to the fact that in 1980 the Community 
did not have the authority to issue regulations and directives unifying or 
harmonizing the conflict rules of the Member States, the Rome Convention 
is formally an independent treaty rather than an instrument of EC law in 
the strict sense, but it is closely connected with the Community in several 
respects, such as the duty of all new Member States to ratify the Convention 
and the competence, since 1 August 2004, of the Court of Justice of the Eu-
ropean Communities (ECJ) to provide authoritative interpretations thereof. 
Since the entry into force in 1999 of the Amsterdam Treaty, Articles 61(c) 
and 65(b) of the EC Treaty stipulate, inter alia, that the Council may take 
measures promoting the compatibility of the rules applicable in the Member 
States concerning the conflict of laws. The need to modernize the conflict-of-
laws provisions of the Rome Convention, partially due to the increasing use 
of the Internet in contracting, resulted therefore not merely in changes in 
the conflict-of-laws rules as such but also in the legal nature of the whole in-
strument. On 17 June 2008, the EC Regulation No 593/2008 on the Law Ap-
plicable to Contractual Obligations (the so-called Rome I Regulation) was 
1 See, in particular, the EC Regulation No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on Jurisdiction and 
the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, Official 
Journal of the European Communities 2001 L 12 p. 1 (the so-called Brussels I Regulation).
2 A consolidated wording of the Convention is found in Official Journal of the European Uni-
on 2005 C 334 p. 1.
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adopted.3 Pursuant to its Articles 24, 28 and 29, the Rome I Regulation shall 
replace the Rome Convention, even though merely with regard to contracts 
concluded after 17 December 2009 (this means that the 1980 Rome Conven-
tion will retain some of its importance for a considerable time in the future). 
Similarly to the Rome Convention, the Rome I Regulation is intended to be 
used in relation to all legal systems in the world, irrespective of whether the 
law specified by its conflict-of-laws rules is the law of a Member State or 
not.  In  this  sense,  the  Regulation  is  intended  to  have  “universal 
application”, without any requirement of reciprocity (Article 2).
In the following, I shall attempt to present the main features of the new 
Regulation, with special focus on those rules that are of particular relevance 
in Internet-related situations. Due to space constraints, the presentation will 
be of an extremely summary nature, omitting many special rules and excep-
tions and containing some unavoidable oversimplifications. 
The main principle of the Rome I Regulation is the same as that of the 
Rome Convention: in Article 3 it allows the parties to choose the legal sys-
tem that is to govern their contract, provided the contract contains an inter-
national element, i. e. provided it is not of a purely domestic nature. This 
main principle is  not affected by the fact that the contract has been con-
cluded or is to be performed through the Internet. The same is true about 
most of the principal conflict rules in article 4, which are used in the absence 
of a choice-of-law clause in the contract, as these rules refer normally dir-
ectly or indirectly to the law of the country where one or the other of the 
parties has his habitual residence, which is a connecting factor normally un-
affected by the use of the Internet. Among these rules,  which are in fact 
mere presumptions because they are disregarded where it is clear from all 
the circumstances of the case that the contract is manifestly more closely 
connected with a country other than the designated one (see Article 4(3)), 
one may mention that a contract for the sale of goods is normally governed 
by the law of the country where the seller has his habitual residence and 
that a contract for the provision of services is normally governed by the law 
of the country of the habitual residence of the service provider. However, at 
the interpretation of these rules it is necessary to keep in mind Article 19(2) 
of the Regulation: where the contract is concluded in the course of the oper-
ations of a branch, agency or any other establishment, or if, under the con-
tract, performance is the responsibility of such an establishment, the place 
where the establishment is located will be treated as the place of habitual 
residence. This gives, again, rise to a question I have had the opportunity to 
3 Official Journal of the European Union 2008 L 177 p. 6.
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speak about here in Brno at the conference “Cyberspace 2005”, namely the 
question of whether a web-site can constitute an establishment for the pur-
poses of private international law. Traditionally, an establishment is ima-
gined as something with physical premises, street address and staff, but an 
interactive web-site  can today fulfill  the same functions,  seeing that con-
tracts can both be entered into and performed through it. I do not wish to 
repeat today what I said three years ago;4 it suffices to say that the Rome I 
Regulation does not shed any new light on that highly controversial issue.
Of considerable interest from the Internet point of view is that a contract 
for the sale of goods by auction will be governed by the law of the country 
where the auction takes place, “if such a place can be determined” (Article 
4(1)(g)). The reason behind this special rule is that at an auction the buyer 
and the seller are often not aware of each other’s habitual residence and the 
application of the law of the country of the habitual residence of the seller 
might come as a complete surprise to the buyer. What comes to mind in this 
context are the Internet auctions which have become quite frequent. The In-
ternet address of one popular auction site operating in Sweden used to have 
the national domain of “.nu”, referring to the small South Pacific island of 
Niue, which is hardly the place where the auction takes place within the 
meaning of Article  4(1)(g).  Some other  Internet  sites,  such as  the world-
renowned  site  operated  by  the  American  company  eBay  Inc.  with 
headquarters in San José in California, do not use any national domain at all 
and prefer an address ending with “.com”. If the site focuses openly on one 
national market only, for example using the Swedish language and quoting 
prices in the Swedish currency or even explicitly stating that the bidding is 
open exclusively  to  persons habitually  residing  in  a  certain  country,  the 
problem can be avoided by relying on the above-mentioned Article 4(3) and 
applying Swedish law as the law of the country with which the contract is 
manifestly most closely connected, but this may not be possible in the case 
of truly international sites, where the seller and the buyer are habitual resid-
ents of different countries and the transactions are negotiated in an interna-
tionally used language such as English. 
Another  provision of Internet  relevance is  Article  4(1)(h),  pursuant  to 
which a contract concluded within a multilateral system which brings to-
gether or facilitates the bringing together of multiple third-party buying and 
selling interest in financial instruments, in accordance with non-discretion-
ary rules and governed by a single legal system, is normally governed by 
that legal system, i.e. by the law proper to the multilateral market as such. 
4 Bogdan, M. 2006, ’Can a Web-site Constitute an Establishment for the Purposes of Jurisdic-
tion and Applicable Law?’ in Cyberspace 2005, ed. Polčák, R., Škop, M. & Šmahel, D.
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The selling and buying of financial instruments within such markets, such 
as stock exchanges, is nowadays normally carried out by electronic means 
and some of the trading is done through the Internet.
The  legal  system governing  the  formal  validity  of  a  contract  (i.e.,  its 
validity in respect of formal requirements such as witnesses, writing or the 
acceptability  of  electronic  signatures)  is  designated  by  Article  11  of  the 
Rome I Regulation, which distinguishes between, on the one hand, contracts 
concluded between persons who (or whose agents) are in the same country 
at the time of conclusion and, on the other hand, contracts between persons 
who (or whose agents) are at the time of contracting in different countries. 
A contract belonging to the former category is formally valid if it satisfies 
the formal requirements of the law which governs it in substance or of the 
law of the country where it is concluded. A contract belonging to the latter 
group is  formally valid  if  it  satisfies  the formal requirements  of  the law 
which governs it  or of the law of any of the countries  where any of the 
parties or their agent was present at the time of conclusion or of the law of 
the country where any of the parties had his habitual residence at that time. 
The use of these rules may be problematic in those cases where the contract 
is concluded through the Internet, because one party may not know where 
the other party or its agent was present at the time of the conclusion of the 
contract.
Article 6 of the Rome I Regulation brings some important changes in re-
spect of consumer contracts, i.e. contracts concluded by a natural person for 
a purpose which can be regarded as being outside his trade or profession 
with a person acting in the exercise of his trade or profession (the profes-
sional). Such contracts will be governed, in respect of both substance and 
form, by the law of the country where the consumer has his habitual resid-
ence and the parties’ choice of another law will not deprive the consumer of 
the protection afforded to him by the mandatory provisions of the law of 
the country of his habitual residence. This privileged position is, however, 
not enjoyed by all consumers, because Article 6 requires, in addition, that 
the contract falls within the scope of the professional’s activities which are 
either pursued by him in the country where the consumer has his habitual 
residence or are directed, by any means, to that country or to several coun-
tries including that country. As much of the marketing on the Internet is, in 
fact,  intended for  consumers  in  many countries,  the last-mentioned situ-
ation is of particular interest and gives rise to questions about the meaning 
of the requirement that the professional directs, by any means, his activities 
to a certain country or group of countries. The exact meaning is unfortu-
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nately not quite clear. Recital 24 makes it clear that this requirement must be 
interpreted as having the same meaning as the identical requirement in Art-
icle 15 in the Brussels I Regulation, dealing with jurisdiction in consumer 
disputes. Recital 24 also refers to a special joint declaration of the Council 
and the Commission on the last-mentioned Article 15. Pursuant to this de-
claration, the mere fact that an Internet site is accessible from the consumer-
’s country is not sufficient and the language or currency used by the website 
does not normally constitute a relevant factor either. The professional may, 
of course, make it clear on his website that he directs himself exclusively at 
consumers habitually  residing in  a particular  country or particular  coun-
tries, or that habitual residents of a particular country or particular coun-
tries are excluded from his offers. But even if the website is silent on this 
point, it would hardly be reasonable to consider an advertisement placed on 
the Internet  by a Czech company, in  the Czech language, with prices  in 
Czech currency, and obviously intended for the Czech consumer market, to 
be directed to Sweden. On the other hand, if the disputed contract has actu-
ally  and  knowingly  been  concluded  over  the  website  with  a  consumer 
residing habitually in a particular country, the language and currency used 
by the website do not constitute relevant factors, for example if the profes-
sional accepts knowingly an order placed through the Czech website by a 
Czech-speaking Swedish resident like myself. Thus, the most relevant factor 
is that the Internet site solicits the conclusion of distance contracts and that 
the  contract  in  dispute  has  actually  been  concluded  at  a  distance,  by 
whatever means (i.e., not necessarily through the soliciting Internet site). 
While  introducing the (alternative)  criterion requiring that the profes-
sional’s  activities be directed to the country of the consumer, the Rome I 
Regulation abolishes some of the requirements found in Article 5(2) of the 
Rome Convention, namely that the conclusion of the contract was preceded 
by a specific invitation addressed to the consumer or by advertising in the 
consumer’s country and that the consumer has taken all the steps necessary 
on his part for the conclusion of the contract in the country of his habitual 
residence. This change is an improvement, because these criteria are hardly 
reasonable in today’s Internet environment, where it often may be difficult 
to decide whether a website  constitutes advertising in the country of the 
consumer and where it should make no difference whether a consumer liv-
ing in Brno has placed his order from home or from an Internet café while 
on a half-day shopping visit in Vienna.
An Internet-related problem, arising in connection with the above-men-
tioned conflict-of-laws  rules  protecting  the  interests  of  the consumers,  is 
2009] M. Bogdan: Contracts in Cyberspace and the Regulation ”Rome I” 225
that the businessman has usually limited possibilities to check whether the 
distant person he contracts with through the Internet is really a consumer or 
not. Even though the protection offered to consumers in Article 6 is in prin-
ciple mandatory and cannot be waived by the consumer in the contract, the 
ECJ has held that a consumer who by his own behavior creates the impres-
sion that he enters into the contract within the framework of his trade or 
profession (for example by using a business letterhead or by claiming the 
right to restitution of value-added tax), must be considered to have validly 
abstained from that protection, provided that his counterpart has acted in 
good faith.5 A similar  approach should be used when the consumer lied 
about his habitual residence, for example because he knew that the profes-
sional would not accept his order if he were aware of his true domicile. It 
may also happen that a businessman acting in the exercise of his trade or 
profession pretends to be a consumer in order to benefit from the advant-
ages  enjoyed by consumers,  but  he  will  naturally  lose  those  advantages 
once his true nature is disclosed.
Pursuant to Article 23, the Regulation does not exclude the possibility of 
inclusion of special conflict-of-law rules relating to contractual obligations 
into provisions of EC law with regard to particular matters. Furthermore, 
Recital 40 states that the Regulation should not prejudice the application of 
other EC instruments laying down provisions designed to contribute to the 
proper functioning of the internal market. The application of the substant-
ive law designated by the Regulation’s conflict rules should not restrict the 
free movement of goods and services as regulated by EC instruments. As an 
example, Recital  40 mentions explicitly  the EC Directive No 2000/31 of 8 
June 2000 on Certain Legal Aspects of Information Society Services, in par-
ticular Electronic Commerce, in the Internal Market (Directive on Electronic 
Commerce).6 Unfortunately, due to its ambiguity this Directive is one of the 
most criticized pieces of EC legislation ever, and its co-existence with the 
Rome I Regulation will probably give rise to complications. 
5 Gruber v. Bay Wa AG (2005) C-464/01; European Court Reports I-439.
6 Official Journal of the European Communities 2000 L 178 p. 1.
